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Judges as Bad Reviewers: Fair Use and
Epistemological Humility
Rebecca Tushnet*
Abstract: The future of fair use depends on whether judges act like bad reviewers, or whether they
behave differently in interpreting challenged works than they do in almost every other aspect of
judging. Ordinarily, judges are asked to produce definitive answers about the meanings of texts.
But when it comes to literary judgments, the bad reviewer is the one who insists that a work has
only one meaning, and announces the bottom line as if it were an absolute. A good reviewer
explains the sources of her judgment, making room for other interpretations. This is also what is
necessary to a good fair use analysis.
Unfortunately, copyright fair use cases rarely acknowledge multiplicity of meaning. Through
discussion of fan-made music videos, this short commentary shows how transformative uses
routinely invite multiple interpretations, just as ‘‘original’’ works do. As a result, a fair use
analysis that insists on reducing works to single meanings will predictably fail in the aim of
protecting transformative works that add new meanings or messages. The proper approach is
epistemological humility: when reasonable audience members could discern commentary on the
original work, a court should find transformation, even when other reasonable audience members
could disagree.
Keywords: copyright / fair use / transformative use / epistemological humility
For a brief commentary, it seems appropriate to start with a provocative
statement: the future of fair use as a formal doctrine in the United States
depends on whether judges act like bad reviewers on Amazon.com, or
whether they behave differently in interpreting challenged works than they
do in almost every other aspect of judging.
Ordinarily, judges are asked to produce definitive answers about the
meanings of texts, and there are both good reasons for them to do so and
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a number of tools that, though highly manipulable in many cases, are well-
established ways of fixing meaning. When a contract promises to deliver
‘‘chickens,’’ what does that mean?1 If it means young chickens and the
defendant supplied mature chickens, then the defendant breached the con-
tract; if ‘‘chickens’’ also includes mature chickens, then the defendant
performed. Fixing meaning is necessary for the court to do its job, and
courts can use dictionary meanings, standard commercial practice, the
parties’ course of dealings, and other evidence to do that job.2 (My claim
here does not depend on the existence of true right answers. Many legal
claims are indeterminate and multiple outcomes could be justified in many
cases, but my point is that an outcome resting on a single specific inter-
pretation of the relevant documents is the regular result of the legal pro-
cess, and that most lawyers generally think that having a fixed meaning is
good or at least necessary for the law to function.3)
There are, to be sure, occasional instances where a judge concludes that
fixing meaning is impossible, but that usually means that the court will find
that there is nothing for the law to regulate. In one famous contracts case,
each of the parties was thinking of a different ship named Peerless as the
relevant subject of the contract, and neither knew about the other Peerless.
The court found that no contract had formed and thus that there was
nothing to enforce.4
In advertising law, only claims that are sufficiently well-defined can be
regulated at all—terms that are vague, general, or likely to be understood
in different ways by different consumers can’t be held to be false adver-
tising. Such claims are mere puffery, and the law won’t intervene to stop
them, conclusively presuming that no reasonable consumer could be misled
by puffery.5
In copyright law, judges regularly disclaim any intent or right to eval-
uate the quality of art,6 even though they are often doing so implicitly.7
Alfred Yen posits that judges in copyright cases are eager to fix the
meaning of works, because the alternative to a single fixed meaning seems
to be the postmodern nightmare in which nothing is certain and com-
munication is impossible.8 But that is what I mean when I talk about the
bad reviewer on Amazon.com: when it comes to literary judgments, the
bad reviewer is the one who insists that a work has only one meaning,
and announces the bottom line as if it were an absolute. A good
reviewer explains the sources of her judgment, making room for other
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interpretations, which may be one reason that a well-written negative
review can be extremely helpful to someone deciding to go ahead and buy
the book anyway.9
Unfortunately, copyright fair use cases rarely acknowledge multiplicity
of meaning. Instead, even a defendant-favorable fair use case tends to fix
one meaning to the plaintiff’s work and another meaning or purpose to the
defendant’s work, and then declare them different enough that the defen-
dant’s use is transformative and therefore fair.10 When the defendant loses,
the court tends to determine that the meaning of the works is the same,11
taking a universalist perspective that denies that different observers might
generate different meanings from the same view.
Peter Jaszi argues that the United States may be moving toward a post-
modern copyright,12 with specific reference to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals ruling in Blanch v. Koons,13 which found that appropriation artist
Jeff Koons made fair use of a copy of a fashion photograph in his painting
Niagara. Appropriation art has certainly been associated with postmodern-
ism’s challenges to the hierarchy of high and low. But Jaszi also identifies
‘‘[r]ejection of claims based on ‘authority’ and ‘expertise,’ including claims
relating to interpretation’’14 as a key characteristic of postmodernism,
which instead promotes a proliferation of meanings. In that sense, Blanch
is not postmodern. The court deferred to Koons on the meaning of and
justification for his copying. Shifting to a particular expert, the artist
himself, the court left the structure of expertise intact.
As Jaszi explains, the court gave ‘‘considerable deference’’ to Koons’s
own explanation of why he used Blanch’s image, taking Koons’s ‘‘self-
expressed claims as an interpreter and repurposer of existing content very
seriously.’’15 Agreeing with Koons’s interpretation, the court concluded
that ‘‘we need not depend on our own poorly honed artistic
sensibilities . . . . [W]e have been given no reason to question his statement
that the use of an existing image advanced his artistic purposes.’’16 Whereas
Jaszi argues, optimistically, that the decision is a harbinger of ‘‘an approach
that distributes attention and concern across the full range of participants in
the processes of cultural production and consumption,’’17 fair use was
determined not on the basis of potential audiences’ understandings of new
meanings from the accused work, but on the ability of the artist to express
his intentions. The only audience reaction that mattered was Koons’s
reaction to Blanch’s work, because he then created a new work in response.
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Thus, rather than accepting that multiple meanings and interpretations can
coexist, the court picked a side in a contest about true meaning, not unlike
a ruling in a contracts case.
But multiple interpretations do exist, and some of them operate in areas
where fair use is clearly foundational to the artistic endeavor. Remix
culture, where debts to earlier sources are not just inherent or acknowl-
edged but flaunted, and where copying often takes place in large chunks
rather than the more classical reference or variation, relies heavily on fair
use (and even more on copyright owners’ toleration, since most remix
artists lack the resources to fight in the name of fair use). I will focus here
on one remix subculture that shows the necessity of acknowledging the
existence of multiple reasonable interpretations if fair use is to have con-
tinued purchase as a means of protecting subsequent creators.
Today, a largely female community of artists known as ‘‘vidders’’ cre-
ates vids: re-edited footage from television shows and movies, set to music
that directs viewers’ attention and guides them through the appropriated
images. This practice can trace its genealogy to the early 1970s, when it
featured slideshows carefully coordinated with music.18 A vid, Francesca
Coppa has written, is an argument made through quotation and narrative.19
Tisha Turk draws attention to the ways in which re-editing visuals and
changing the soundtrack serve to transform the original narrative in ways
that conventional text-based literary theories find difficult to recognize:
[A] vid always represents at least two stories: the story contained within the
original source text, and the story of the vidder’s response to and trans-
formation of that text at the level of narration. H. Porter Abbott has
observed that the burden of narration in film and television is borne not by
a speaker but ‘‘by the camera (the angles, duration, and sequencing of what
it sees) and not uncommonly by music’’; these elements of discourse are
exactly what vidders alter. A vidder chooses which camera angles to keep or
discard, how long each clip should be, and what order those clips should be
presented in; and of course she also adds a soundtrack, a song that provides
a voice for a character or in some cases for the vidder herself.20
By changing editing and music, the vidder changes meaning. But how
would a court treat the argument that the vidder’s work is transformative?
The answer depends in significant part on whether the court would be able
to recognize that different people receive the same work in varying ways.
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Vids often depend on close readings of the underlying text, as well as
embeddedness in specific communities of fans, and can seem unintelligible
or meaningless to people who aren’t aware of the context. In one striking
instance, a Star Trek vid set to the Nine Inch Nails song ‘‘Closer’’ con-
structed a scenario in which Spock sexually assaulted Kirk during his pon
farr (biologically mandated ‘‘time of mating’’). The vid crossed over from
the Star Trek vid community to a much larger audience on YouTube,
where many people considered it a joke rather than a reading embedded in
a forty-year history of Kirk/Spock slash and pon farr stories.21
In a more recent example, the artist Gianduja Kiss made a vid, ‘‘It
Depends on What You Pay.’’ The vid illustrates how the television show
Dollhouse,22 created by critically acclaimed TV auteur Joss Whedon, de-
pended on a premise that was fundamentally about rape. On the show,
characters repeatedly had their minds wiped and personalities implanted,
often to fulfill another’s sexual desires. The show tried very hard to dis-
tance itself from rape both by appealing to concepts of prior consent (even
as the narrative explained that, at minimum, several key characters had not
consented to this treatment) and by defining and distinguishing ‘‘real’’
rapists from the other people responsible for the scenario. ‘‘It Depends
on What You Pay’’ sets scenes from Dollhouse to a song from the original
version of The Fantasticks.23 The song is about—indeed, it celebrates—
rape. The opening lyrics are:
Rape!
R-a-a-a-pe!
Raa-aa-aa-pe!
A pretty rape!
We’ve the obvious open schoolboy rape,
With little mandolins and perhaps a cape.
The rape by coach; it’s little in request.
The rape by day, but the rape by night is best.24
Gianduja Kiss edits these lines to accompany scenes of apparently consen-
sual, tender encounters that in fact involve the un-consenting, brainwashed
‘‘dolls,’’ as well as scenes that showcase actresses’ bodies for the audience’s
delectation. The vid quickly moves to scenes of physical and sexual vio-
lence, highlighting the continuity between the coerced happiness and the
coerced suffering experienced by the dolls. The juxtaposition of this now-
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suppressed song with the images from Dollhouse forces the ugly premise
of the show to the surface.
When the vid crossed over from the vidding community to the more
general Joss Whedon fan community, many commenters took issue with
the vid, on two distinct grounds. First, the vid said nothing new, because
Dollhouse was obviously a rape narrative already. Second, the vid consti-
tuted unfair criticism because the show was clearly not about rape at all.25
The second response demonstrated the insufficiency of the first. Many
people wanted to watch Dollhouse and also absolve themselves of enjoying
a rape narrative. The vid itself argued that Dollhouse was part of rape
culture: a failure to see rape as rape, which the holders of the second view
then enacted.
Relatedly, when a videomaker created a remix showing James Bond’s
use and abuse—sexual and physical—of women, some of the responses on
YouTube read the remix as a celebration of James Bond rather than as
a criticism. As Elisa Kreisinger explained,
By isolating (and occasionally repeating) the images of glorified aggression,
objectification and, as the artist puts it, ‘‘womanizing’’, the remix creates
a rarely acknowledged but more accurate portrayal of Bond’s misogynistic
masculinity . . . . Among the male commentors [on] the original remix,
there seemed to be very little wrong with the James Bond brand of mas-
culinity [the videomaker] created. In fact, the highest rated and most recent
comments illustrated that viewers did not see this remix as a critique but
a celebration of Bond’s treatment of women.26
While Kreisinger saw a very clear expose´ and critique of misogyny and
James Bond-style masculinity, that meaning was opaque to numerous other
viewers. This is not just a matter of naı¨ve versus sophisticated readings.
It would have very real legal consequences in the event the remix was
challenged by the owners of the copyrights in the James Bond films. If a
court were to accept the reaction of some viewers that these vids merely
reinforced their impressions of the original, the implication would be that
the vids were not transformative—they would not add a new meaning or
message that was not to be found in the original—and thus not fair use.
The district court in Salinger v. Colting applied exactly this mistaken
reasoning when finding that the book 60 Years Later was a mere infringing
sequel to The Catcher in the Rye, denying fair use because it considered that
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a sophisticated reader would have automatically understood the defen-
dant’s alleged critique without any need for the defendant’s copying.27
Rejecting the defendant’s claim that 60 Years Later was transformative
because it exposed and highlighted the ultimate ridiculousness and failure
of Holden Caulfield’s angst, the court reasoned that ‘‘Holden Caulfield as
delineated by Salinger was already often ‘miserable’ and ‘unconnected’ as
well as frequently ‘absurd[ ]’ and ‘ridiculous,’ as Colting says of his elderly
version of the character . . . . [T]hose effects were already thoroughly
depicted and apparent in Salinger’s own narrative about Caulfield.’’28
The court here intervenes in a literary dispute. Although some people
surely always saw Caulfield as a pathetic loser, others disagreed.29 The
problem was not that the court was a bad art critic. I’m inclined to agree
that Holden was always pathetic, and certainly this response strikes me as
well within the range of understandable critical reaction to The Catcher in
the Rye. But the court was a bad reviewer, unable to see the ways in which
other people might think differently. The disagreement over the reception
of the original—in which Holden is a cultural hero and rebel to some, even
as he is a pure loser to others—itself demonstrates that a version of Holden
Caulfield focused on his pitiable and failed life is a critical intervention into
an ongoing debate.
The history of parody and similar forms is one in which defenders of
a targeted work always have available the responses, ‘‘That’s not really in
there; you’re seeing things!’’ and ‘‘That’s obvious; your so-called parody is
not subverting anything.’’ Converted into legal reasoning, both these re-
sponses could underlie a finding that a new work was not transformative of
an old one.30 Yet the interaction between those responses, as with ‘‘It
Depends on What You Pay,’’ can demonstrate how the new work is
transformative by making parts of the old more salient (and more uncom-
fortable for its fans).
To take a literary example, before Thomas Dixon wrote The Clansman31
(made famous in film as Birth of a Nation), he wrote a ‘‘sequel’’ to Harriet
Beecher Stowe’s Uncle Tom’s Cabin. Dixon intended to refute Stowe’s
novel by turning Simon Legree into a carpetbagger and defending the
honor of the South. A number of reviewers saw his book as a superior
successor to Stowe’s, though reactions were divided.32 Many others also
rewrote Uncle Tom’s Cabin to criticize the novel and defend slavery, often
styling the results as ‘‘sequels,’’ suggesting that they could be read either as
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criticism or as logical extension.33 Essentially, some authors and audiences
found in Stowe’s original work fodder for pro-slavery narratives, despite
both her intent and the reactions of other, larger audiences. Consider also
whether a modern reader might not agree with aspects of Dixon’s reading,
though for different reasons, because of the ways in which Stowe used and
shaped stereotypes of African Americans.
This pattern of multiple interpretations appears with other works, from
Don Quixote to works by Alexander Pope such as The Rape of the Lock.34
Nabokov’s estate disputed whether the book Lo’s Diary was a transforma-
tive revision of Lolita or simply a juvenile misreading of Nabokov’s work
of genius.35 The estate’s position was that Lolita did not need to be
rewritten from the perspective of Dolores Haze to demonstrate the mon-
strousness of Humbert Humbert, because he was already a monster. Yet,
from the beginning, critics have worried that Lolita makes Humbert too
sympathetic.36 Even individual understandings of whether work is trans-
formative or simply imitative can change over time: noted art critic Dou-
glas Crimp first read Robert Mapplethorpe’s photography as simply
copying, rather than commenting on, classical styles; later, he came to
understand how Mapplethorpe radically changed the meaning of those
styles by addressing the spectator as a homosexual subject.37
Copyright rarely confronts this excess of meaning even though, as
a general rule, creative works—especially those influential enough to
provoke creative responses from other people—can be read in multiple
different ways. But the instability of meaning, if unacknowledged, creates
a fault line in fair use. Copyright doctrine tells us that a use is more likely to
be fair when it targets something that is, in some sense, in the original work
rather than using the original as a launching point for critiquing or
discussing an unrelated idea.38 Courts aren’t exactly looking for ‘‘new’’
meaning, but more for excavation of existing meaning or identification of
structures and concepts in the original work that are susceptible to partic-
ular critical interpretations. This in turn means that the transformative user
will readily be subject to the criticism that she didn’t say anything we (who
are of course perceptive and thoughtful) did not already know. Without
recognizing that works mean different things to different people, transfor-
mativeness as a concept is at war with itself.
To work as an expression-promoting concept, transformativeness must
be recognized as highly variable and even audience-specific. The media
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studies literature has shown that different audiences read mainstream
works differently, meaning that there is no one message that a transforma-
tive user could then reject and criticize.39 For example, prejudiced and
unprejudiced viewers ascribed different meanings to All in the Family, as
evidenced by the fact that ‘‘some viewers write letters . . . which applaud
Archie for his racist viewpoint, while others applaud the show for effec-
tively making fun of bigotry.’’40 Viewers’ perception of the program’s
intent to satirize Archie Bunker’s prejudices was greatest among nonpre-
judiced viewers and least among prejudiced viewers.41
Indeed, it’s possible to read many popular works in directly contradic-
tory ways—this openness may be part of why they are popular. But this
multivalence should not insulate them from transformative uses. There is
room for contradictory transformative reactions to the original, even when
some viewers think that a particular remix only reiterates what’s already
present in the original. This desire to read a work as supporting one’s own
commitments may also do something to explain why satisfied fans of
Dollhouse and James Bond didn’t see anything legitimate or critical about
the respective vids. Having already been satisfied with the views expressed
in the original, they were less likely to perceive criticism or alternative
readings as justified.
Although it would require a kind of epistemological humility that we
don’t expect—and don’t often want—from judges in other cases, a fair use
analysis sensitive to how creative works make meaning would be much
more open to multiple interpretations. In Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music
(1994), the Supreme Court case that elevated transformativeness to a key
component of fair use, Justice Souter wanted to ensure that courts favored
parody (which he defined as targeting the original work itself) above mere
satire (which he defined as using the original work as a vehicle to attach
something else) in the transformativeness inquiry.42 Among other things,
this formulation ignored the difficulty of distinguishing parody from satire
in both literary criticism and law.43 However, his use of the passive voice
signals the deeper instability in the case: ‘‘The threshold question when fair
use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may
reasonably be perceived.’’44 Reasonably be perceived by whom?
I propose that when reasonable audience members could discern com-
mentary on the original work, a court should find favored ‘‘parody,’’ even
when other reasonable audience members could disagree. This would
Law & Li terature  Volume 25, Number 1
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require adhering to the majority opinion, in contrast to the narrow and
unitary vision of transformativeness expressed by Justice Kennedy in his
concurrence, where he cautioned that ‘‘[m]ore than arguable parodic con-
tent should be required to deem a would be parody a fair use . . . . [D]oubts
about whether a given use is fair should not be resolved in favor of the self-
proclaimed parodist.’’45 Kennedy was afraid of letting meaning get out of
hand, but he was far too late for that.
As I noted earlier, nondiscrimination is a fundamental principle of
modern copyright law: courts are not supposed to be art critics.46 That
doesn’t mean they will, or indeed can, avoid making aesthetic judgments.
However, to make fair use work, courts should assess transformativeness
from multiple perspectives, with attention to what different audiences
might see in a work and in an allegedly transformative remix of that
work.47 What is needed is a greater degree of epistemological humility,
the kind that a good reviewer has. There is some risk that this approach
will simply transfer the problem to defining who counts as a ‘‘reasonable’’
audience member, but the existence of communities of practice—whether
appropriation artists, vidders, or others—who react to the new work as
having a different meaning than the original could help establish that such
audiences are both reasonable and real.
The current version of transformativeness tends to involve a fair amount
of courts knowing it when they see it.48 But as Catharine MacKinnon says,
they may not know what I know when I see what I see. Only deliberate
attention to the multiple ways in which audiences react both to plaintiffs’
works and to defendants’ work can allow fair use to promote a truly robust
creative environment in which multiple interpretations flourish.
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